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NOTES
Reining in Civil Forfeiture Law and Protecting Innocent
Owners from Civil Asset Forfeiture: United States v. 92
Buena Vista Avenue
Civil forfeiture of assets traceable to narcotics transactions has become
one of the most prominent weapons in this country's "war on drugs." 1 As
applied against the drug trade, civil forfeiture has an intense appeal. The
federal government2 seizes and condemns assets traceable to illegal narcot-
ics transactions in civil proceedings in rem, thus operating outside the ordi-
nary criminal process and its attendant "impediments" such as the
presumption of innocence and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'
By using these in rem proceedings, the government may avoid engaging in
criminal prosecutions when evidence is insufficient to obtain a conviction,
4
as well as continue to pursue persons who have been acquitted of criminal
charges.5 The federal government then uses forfeited assets to fund further
law enforcement efforts against the drug trade.6
Although use of the civil forfeiture mechanism is quite alluring, the
federal government's implementation of the process has given civil forfei-
ture law a darker side. The federal government has used the civil forfeiture
mechanism in recent years to deprive not only drug traffickers, but also
1. From 1985 to 1991, the number of seizures per year under the federal forfeiture laws
increased 18 times to 35,295 seizures in 1991. David A. Kaplan et al., Where the Innocent Lose:
Civil-Forfeiture Law Can Put Your Furniture in Jail, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 42. The
amounts deposited into the Asset Forfeiture Fund, the account in which the government places
forfeited assets, increased from $27 million in 1985 to $531 million in 1992. Henry Hyde, Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993: A Briefing Paper 6 (unpublished manuscript obtained from
the office of Congressman Henry Hyde, on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The fund
swelled to $2.6 billion by 1992. Kaplan, supra, at 42. Eighty percent of seizures under the federal
forfeiture laws go uncontested. Id.; Hyde, supra, at 5. The Department of Justice attributes the
high rate of uncontested seizures to the fact that in the vast majority of cases, the government has
such strong cases against the claimants that they do not care to confront the government in court.
Kaplan, supra, at 43.
2. Many states also have forfeiture laws that they actively enforce. See generally 2 DAVID
B. SMrrH, PROSECtrIoN AND DEFENSE OF FoPR.rruRE CAsES U 16.01-18.02, at 16-1 to 18-20
(1992 & Supp. 1992) (discussing forfeiture laws in New York, Florida, and Texas).
3. See MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, AssEr FoRFErruRE-Crvu. FoRFEIrruRE: TRAcING THE PRO-
CEEDS OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING 1-5 (1992).
4. 1 SMrrH, supra note 2, 1.02, at 1-6.
5. GOLDSMITH, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Of the [$531 million] taken in 1992 ... $230 million of the total was returned to state
and local law enforcement agencies who helped in investigations. And $30 million in forfeited
property was pressed into official use by federal law enforcement agencies or transferred to state
and local law enforcement agencies.
Hyde, supra note 1, at 6-7.
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persons who are not connected with the drug trade, of their assets.7 In
19788 Congress amended the civil forfeiture provisions of the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 19709 to permit forfeiture
of assets traceable to transactions in illegal narcotics. Since then the federal
government has endeavored to exploit civil forfeiture law to the fullest ex-
tent possible, often without regard for the impact on innocent property own-
ers.10 The pleas of these innocent property owners ensnared by the civil
forfeiture laws-many of whom had acquired their property after it was
used for illegal purposes and without knowledge of its tainted character-
largely fell on deaf ears, as few courts were willing to grant relief to inno-
cent property owners.'1 However, a few courts rejected the government's
arguably draconian arguments and tactics, and dispensed relief to innocent
property owners unjustly deprived of their property. 2 Overall, the federal
courts remained divided over the extent, if any, to which federal civil forfei-
ture law protected the rights of innocent owners.
In United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 3 the United States
Supreme Court tackled this particularly controversial issue. The question in
92 Buena Vista Avenue was whether a donee of money traceable to an ille-
gal narcotics transaction is entitled to invoke the "innocent owner" defense
afforded by 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) in response to a civil forfeiture action by
the federal government.' 4 The problem centered on the so-called "relation
back" doctrine, which holds that title to the offending property vests in the
government upon commission of the offending act.15 The government
maintained that at the time of the illegal act, title to the property vested in
the government, and that thereafter, no one else could acquire an interest in
the property. 6 Accordingly, no subsequent transferee would be entitled to
invoke the innocent owner defense because the transferee could hold no
interest in the property.17 In a six to three decision, the Court held that
under the relation back doctrine, title to forfeitable property does not actu-
7. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
8. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a)(1), § 511 (a)(6), 92
Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
9. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV)).
10. See supra note 1.
11. In particular, the courts have applied the "relation back" doctrine, discussed infra notes
93-102 and accompanying text, to forfeit property held by subsequent owners. See infra note 165
and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
13. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
14. Id. at 1129 (plurality opinion).
15. Id. at 1131 (plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 1134 (plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 1134-35 (plurality opinion).
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ally vest in the government until a court issues a decree of forfeiture. 18
Therefore, persons may acquire an interest in the property after the commis-
sion of the illegal act giving rise to forfeiture and are thus entitled to invoke
any defense available to an owner.' 9 The Court's decision in 92 Buena
Vista Avenue settled a question that had divided the circuits and engendered
criticism from many commentators.2 ° As a result of the Court's decision,
persons acquiring an interest in property after the occurrence of alleged acts
subjecting the property to forfeiture may assert the defense of actual inno-
cence as "innocent owners" in federal forfeiture proceedings.
This Note first discusses the facts of 92 Buena Vista Avenue,2 and
summarizes the plurality,22 concurring,23 and dissenting opinions24 filed in
the case. Next, it reviews the history of civil forfeiture law generally, as
well as the history of 21 U.S.C. § 881 and related statutes.2 The Note also
examines the problem posed by the intersection of the relation back doc-
trine and the innocent owner defense afforded by § 881(a)(6),26 analyzes
the three opinions,27 and comments on the state of civil forfeiture law. 8
This note concludes that 92 Buena Vista Avenue correctly restrains civil
forfeiture law from excesses that have led many to question its legitimacy.29
Joseph A. Brenna and respondent Beth Ann Goodwin became romanti-
cally involved in 1981.30 In 1982, Brenna wired approximately $216,000
dollars to his attorney in New Jersey, instructing him to give the money to
Goodwin. Goodwin then used the money to purchase the defendant3' prop-
erty.32 The sole record owner of the property, she has lived on the property
18. Id. at 1137 (plurality opinion); id. at 1138-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
19. Id. at 1137 (plurality opinion).
20. E.g., Mark A. Jankowski, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable
Approach to Civil Forefeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. Rnv. 165, 196 (1990).
21. See infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 78-164 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 169-218 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 219-35 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
30. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion).
31. In civil forfeiture law, the property, and not its owner, is treated as the wrongdoer. See
infra note 155 and accompanying text. Because of this common-law fiction, it is appropriate in
civil forfeiture law to speak as though the property committed the crime and otherwise to refer to
the property as though it were a natural person.
32. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion). According to the Court, the
amount Brenna transferred was "approximately $240,000." Id. (plurality opinion). However, the
lower courts in this case observed that the amount was closer to $216,000, and that this money
was put toward the $240,000 purchase price of the house. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D.N.J. 1990), rev'd, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 113 S. Ct.
1126 (1993); see also Gary M. Maveal, ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases:
1994] 1335
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with her three children since that time.33 Brenna and Goodwin ended their
relationship in 1987.1'
In 1988, Brenna pled guilty to failure to file a currency report for the
wire transfer of $225,000, part of which he had transferred to Goodwin. 35
On April 3, 1989, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), the federal govern-
ment commenced a civil forfeiture action in rem against the property by
filing a verified complaint alleging that the proceeds used to purchase it
were traceable to drug transactions performed by Brenna; therefore, the
property was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 6 At an ex
parte proceeding on April 12, 1989, the district court found probable cause
to believe that the money Goodwin had used to purchase the property was
traceable to a transaction in illegal narcotics, and the court issued a sum-
mons and a warrant for seizure of the property.37 Shortly after seizing the
property, the United States Marshals Service and Goodwin entered an
agreement allowing her to remain in possession of her home until the com-
pletion of the forfeiture litigation.3"
When Do Innocent Owners Have a Legal Defense to the Government's Seizure of Their Homes
Under Drug Forfeiture Laws? (1992), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, PRE-VU file (stating
the amount of the wire transfer and the purchase price of the property).
33. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion).
34. Id. (plurality opinion).
35. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. at 858.
36. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion). The contents of the verified
complaint are set out in the district court's opinion, 738 F. Supp. at 857-58. Section 881(a)(6)
provides as follows:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to
be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). Real property is subject to forfeiture under this provision if it were
purchased with proceeds traceable to an illegal narcotics transaction. See, e.g., United States v.
Four Parcels of Real Property on Lake Forrest Circle, 870 F.2d 586, 589 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989);
United States v. 8584 Old Brownsville Rd., 736 F.2d 1129, 1130 (6th Cir. 1984).
37. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 1130 n.3 (plurality opinion). Agreements like this one are not uncommon in cases
involving the seizure of real property. It appears to be standard procedure for the government to
secure agreements from the persons in possession of the property at the time of seizure to remain
in possession pending the resolution of the forfeiture action:
When possible, the seized property should be kept occupied by the tenants. Keeping it
occupied can lessen deterioration, deter vandalism, offset the costs of management, and
provide continuation of mortgage payments. Particular consideration should be given to
retaining the individuals who were occupying the property at the time of seizure. This
eliminates the need to find new tenants, and also avoids the adverse publicity that may
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Goodwin appeared in court as a claimant of the property and filed a
motion for summary judgment.39 The district court found probable cause to
believe that the property had been purchased with proceeds traceable to an
illegal narcotics transaction, and was therefore subject to forfeiture.40 In-
voking the innocent owner defense afforded by 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),
Goodwin asserted that she had no knowledge that the money she had re-
ceived from Brenna was derived from an illegal narcotics transaction.41
Relying on a case from the Southern District of Florida,42 the district court
held that Goodwin was not entitled to invoke the defense because it pro-
tected only bona fide purchasers for value.4 3 Because she had given no
consideration for the proceeds Brenna transferred to her, Goodwin was not
such a purchaser.'
On appeal, the Third Circuit reviewed the text of § 881(a)(6) and re-
jected the district court's holding that the innocent owner exception of
§ 881(a)(6) was available only to bona fide purchasers for value.4 5 The
court observed that the legislative history of the statute indicates that the
term "owner" should be interpreted broadly to cover anyone with a " 'rec-
ognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized."' 46 The court
also rejected the government's argument that Goodwin could not be an
"owner" of the property because the relation back doctrine codified in 21
U.S.C. § 881(h) vested title in the government from the moment of the ille-
gal act; therefore, no one could acquire an interest in the property after that
accompany an immediate eviction. Keeping the property occupied while protecting the
interest of the seizing agency can be accomplished by means of an occupancy agree-
ment, executed at or near the time of seizure .... Such an agreement, much like a lease,
can include terms regarding maintenance responsibilities, rent payment, entry by the
seizing agency, eviction, and insurance coverage.
GEORGE N. AYLESWORTH, Assir FoRFErruRE-FoFErruP.E OF REAL PROPERTY: AN OvERvmw
15-16 (1991). For a sample occupancy agreement, see id. at 29-32.
39. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion). Goodwin's motion was
actually a consolidated motion to dismiss the verified complaint, for summary judgment, and to
compel discovery. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. at 856. In her motion, she asserted that the
seizure itself was unconstitutional; that the property was not subject to forfeiture because she was
an innocent owner; that the verified complaint was based in part on immunized testimony; that the
government unduly delayed in seizing the property or alternatively was barred by the statute of
limitations from maintaining the forefeiture action; and that the government refused to respond to
requests for discovery. Id.
40. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion).
41. Id; see supra note 36 for the text of the innocent owner exception.
42. United States v. 2901 S.W. 118th Ct., 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
43. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1130 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 1130 n.4 (plurality opinion).
45. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 101-03.
46. Id. at 102 (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 124 CONG. REC.
17,647 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23); see infra notes 146-50 and ac-
companying text.
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time.47 The court held that property covered by the innocent owner excep-
tion of § 881(a)(6) was not subject to forfeiture, and accordingly, § 881(h)
did not apply.4" The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve a conflict among the circuits on this issue.49
In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court rejected the government's
argument that the relation back doctrine prevented Goodwin from asserting
the innocent owner defense.50 Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality,
briefly reviewed the history of forfeiture law in the United States and the
history of the innocent owner exception of § 881(a)(6)51 before taking on
the issue of whether a subsequent donee of proceeds traceable to an illegal
drug transaction could invoke the innocent owner defense. The plurality
disposed of the district court's interpretation of the innocent owner defense
by holding that, by its plain language, the exception language is not limited
to bona fide purchasers for value.52 Accordingly, Goodwin's status as a
donee was the same as if she had been a purchaser for value. 3
The plurality then addressed the government's relation back argument
that Goodwin never acquired an interest in the property because title to the
property vested in the government upon commission of the illegal act. 4
The plurality explained that the government's interpretation of the relation
back doctrine would "effectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in
47. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102. Section 881(h), enacted by Congress in 1984,
provides that:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall
vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section.
21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
48. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 102. Furthermore, the court declared that to interpret
§ 881(h) in the manner proposed by the government would effectively "emasculate the innocent
owner defense provided for in section 881(a)(6). No one obtaining property after the occurrence
of the drug transaction-including a bona fide purchase [sic] for value-would be eligible to
offer an innocent owner defense on his behalf." Id.
49. 112 S. Ct. 1260 (1992). The Court specifically noted the decisions of two other circuits
prompting it to grant certiorari to this case: In re One 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th
Cir. 1989) and Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. United States, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990). In these cases, the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits accepted the government's argument that § 881(h) operated to vest all right and
title to defendant properties in the government upon commission of the illegal act giving rise to
forfeiture. These courts of appeals also agreed with the government that no third party could
acquire an enforceable interest in the property after that time. 1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d at 1320;
Eggleston, 873 F.2d at 247; see 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1131 (plurality opinion).
50. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 1131-34 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 1134 (plurality opinion). The Court also noted that the government no longer
challenged this aspect of the court of appeals's opinion. Id. (plurality opinion).
53. Id. (plurality opinion).
54. Id. (plurality opinion).
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almost every imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited."55 The
plurality also observed that the government relied heavily on the common-
law relation back doctrine, primarily because the government recognized
that Congress did not enact § 881(h) until 1984, two years after Goodwin
had acquired the defendant property.56 After reviewing Supreme Court
case law on forfeiture dating back to the early nineteenth century, the plu-
rality concluded that the common-law relation back doctrine is "fictive" and
does not actually vest title to the property in the government until it has
secured a decree of forfeiture.57 "Until the Government does win [a decree
of forfeiture], however, someone else owns the property. That person may
therefore invoke any defense available to the owner of the property before
the forfeiture is decreed."58
After concluding that the common-law relation back doctrine did not
prevent Goodwin from invoking the innocent owner defense, the plurality
examined Congress's codification of the relation back doctrine in
§ 881(h). 59 The plurality carefully observed that when forfeiture is author-
ized by statute, the common-law rules regarding at what time title to the
property vests can be disregarded; the legislature may provide that title
vests immediately or on performance of some act by the government.60 In-
terpreting § 881(h), the plurality concluded that Congress intended to cod-
ify the pre-existing common-law rule.61 Additionally, the plurality read the
phrase "property described in subsection (a)" as excluding property covered
by the innocent owner exception of § 881(a)(6). 62 The plurality thus main-
tained that property held by an owner who successfully demonstrates her
innocence is not subject to forfeiture.63 If property is not subject to forfei-
ture under one of the classes of property described in subsection (a), then
55. Id. at 1135 (plurality opinion).
56. Id. (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 1135-36 (plurality opinion). In particular, the plurality focused on the following
statement from Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 337, 350-51 (1806):
It has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing vests in the
government until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion of its right, after which,
for many purposes, the doctrine of relation carries back the title to the commission of
the offence.
The plurality also focused on a passage from United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890),
and concluded that it stands for the proposition that the relation back doctrine is fictive and does
not operate until the government secures a decree of forfeiture. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at
1135-36 (plurality opinion); see infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
58. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136 (plurality opinion).
59. Id. (plurality opinion).
60. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 351).
61. Id. (plurality opinion); see infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
62. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136-37 (plurality opinion).
63. Id. (plurality opinion).
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§ 881(h) does not apply. Therefore, § 881(h) does not prevent a claimant
from invoking the innocent owner defense, and even if that defense ulti-
mately fails, the government may not rely on that section until it has se-
cured a decree of forfeituref
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
agreed with the plurality that the relation back doctrine is a doctrine of
"retroactive vesting of title" that takes effect only upon a decree of forfei-
ture and has the effect of vesting title in the government as of the time an
offense is committed.65 However, Justice Scalia took issue with the plural-
ity's conclusion that the phrase "property described in subsection (a)" does
not include property covered by the innocent owner exception of
§ 881(a)(6).66 He maintained that the plurality "beg[ged] the question" by
holding that because § 881(a)(6) must be applied before § 881(h), the term
"owner" in § 881(a)(6) includes persons who held title to the property prior
to a decree of forfeiture.67 Justice Scalia also observed that under the gov-
ernment's interpretation of § 881(h), no one, not even someone who held an
interest at the time of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, would be able
to invoke the defense; those persons would, at best, be "former owners." 68
Justice Scalia also argued that this interpretation of § 881(h) is the only one
reconcilable with the procedures for forfeiture because those procedures in-
dicate that the government does not obtain legal title to the property until it
has obtained a decree of forfeiture.69
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White,
dissented from the Court's opinion.70 Justice Kennedy maintained that the
proper question was whether "the donee had any ownership rights that re-
quired a separate forfeiture, given that her title was defective and subject to
64. Id. at 1137 (plurality opinion). The plurality also stated that Goodwin had the burden of
demonstrating to the district court that she was not aware of the source of the funds she received
from Brenna at the time she received them. Id. (plurality opinion); see infra note 69.
65. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1138-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (em-
phasis added).
66. Id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. at 1140 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) provides
that the procedures used to adjudicate violations of the customs laws apply in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Those procedures are currently set forth at 19 U.S.C §§ 1602-18 (1988 & Supp. IV).
Justice Scalia also disagreed with the plurality that Goodwin had assumed the burden of
proving on remand that she was an innocent owner, arguing that both sides had taken positions in
their briefs that would be detrimental to them on remand. He maintained that the Court should not
address the issue since neither party had attempted to change its position, nor was the issue within
the question on which the Court granted certiorari. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1142
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra note 64.
70. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the government's claim from the outset."'" He asserted that Goodwin had
no interest in the property superior to that of the government and that in-
quiries into her knowledge of the source of the funds were unnecessary.72
Justice Kennedy argued that the law of voidable title should control who
may invoke the innocent owner defense.73 After setting forth the basic
rules of voidable title and applying them to the facts, Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that Goodwin was not entitled to invoke the defense.74 Because she
had given no consideration for the $216,000 that Brenna transferred to her,
she was not a bona fide purchaser for value, and accordingly, she did not
receive good title to the money.75 As a holder of defective title, her interest
had to yield to the superior interest of the government.76 Justice Kennedy
concluded his dissent by arguing that the plurality's interpretation of
§§ 881(a)(6) and 881(h) "leaves the forfeiture scheme that is the center-
piece of the Nation's drug enforcement laws in quite a mess," in part be-
cause it opens the door for drug dealers to shield their assets from forfeiture
by giving them to an innocent party and reacquiring them after law enforce-
ment officers have ceased to pursue them.7 7
The Court decided 92 Buena Vista Avenue in the context of general
civil forfeiture law, an area of law with ancient roots. The law of forfeiture
originated in the English common-law concept of deodands. 7s This term is
derived from the Latin Deo dandum, or "a thing to be given to God."7 9
According to English common law, a chattel that caused the death of one of
the King's subjects was forfeit to the crown as a deodand, and the crown
was to use the chattel for "pious" purposes, usually for the benefit of the
poor through a giving of alms."0 The law of deodands can be traced to
certain Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which regarded the ob-
ject that caused the death of another as the wrongdoer in need of religious
71. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. Id, (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974). Pearson
Yacht contains an excellent summary of the law of deodands and of forfeiture law in general. A
full exposition of the law of deodands is beyond the scope of this Note. Interested readers may
consult OLIVER W. HoLMEs JR., THE COMMON LAW 24-26 (1881), and Joseph J. Finldestein, The
Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the
Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170-97 (1973), for a more in-depth treatment
of the law of deodands.
79. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (6th ed. 1990).
80. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 680-81; BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 79, at 436.
19941 1341
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expiation."' Deodands remained a part of the common law of England until
1846 when Parliament abolished the doctrine by passing Lord Campbell's
Act,82 which created a cause of action for wrongful death.8 3
Although the common law of the United States never incorporated the
law of deodands,"4 the concept of forfeiture did become part of this coun-
try's jurisprudence. During the colonial era and the time of the Articles of
Confederation, American common-law courts exercised in rem jurisdiction
to enforce British and local customs and revenue laws that provided forfei-
ture as the penalty for their violation. 5 Shortly after the ratification of the
United States Constitution, Congress enacted legislation authorizing the for-
feiture of ships and cargoes found to be in violation of the customs laws.8 6
Congress also enacted civil forfeiture legislation declaring ships involved in
the slave trade forfeit to the government.8 7 Congress later used civil forfei-
ture to combat "piratical aggression" on the high seas by authorizing the
capture and condemnation of vessels engaged in piracy.88 As a weapon in
the battle against alcohol manufacturers who evaded revenue payments to
81. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 680-81. The Bible speaks of at least one instance in which an
item of personal property may be forfeit for causing the death of another. For example, Exodus
21:28 states, "[if] an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned: and his flesh
shall not be eaten." Additionally, a medieval writer once declared, "Where a man killeth another
with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as a deodand, and yet no default is in the
owner." Ho.MEs, supra note 78, at 25.
82. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (Eng.).
83. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 681 n.19. Over time, the original rationale for deodands-
that the object itself needed religious expiation-eroded. Nevertheless, the doctrine remained a
part of the law, as it continued to be a source of revenue for the Crown and served as a penalty and
deterrent for carelessly causing the death of another in the absence of a cause of action for wrong-
ful death. Id. Parliament abolished the law of deodands in 1846. Deodand Abolition Act, 1846, 9
& 10 Vict., ch. 62 (Eng.). However, it did so in concert with the passage of Lord Campbell's Act,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (Eng.), which created a cause of action for wrongful death. Lord
Campbell opposed eliminating the law of deodands without a comparable cause of action for the
survivors of tortfeasors, especially railroads, who caused the deaths of others. Pearson Yacht, 416
U.S. at 681 n.19.
84. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 682 (citing Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn.
1916)).
85. Id. at 683 (quoting C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)).
86. E.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 16, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 41 (repealed 1790); Act of
Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1 Stat. 145, 157, 161, 163, 176 (repealed 1799). One
of these early forfeiture statutes provided as follows:
[A]ll goods, wares, and merchandise, so landed or discharged, shall become forfeited,
and may be seized by an officer of the customs; and where the value thereof shall
amount to four hundred dollars, the vessel, tackle, apparel and furniture, shall be subject
to like forfeiture and seizure.
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 29, 39 (repealed 1790).
87. Act of March 22, 1794, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 347, 349 (forfeiture of ships exporting slaves
from the United States); Act of March 2, 1807, ch. 22, §§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 426 (banning the slave trade
after January 1, 1808 and forfeiting ships involved in the slave trade after that date).
88. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 7-8 (1827). The piracy statute applied in The
Palmyra is now codified, as amended, at 33 U.S.C. §§ 381-387 (1988).
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the government, Congress utilized civil forfeiture to authorize the seizure of
illegal distilled spirits, wines, and stills, as well as the land upon which they
were found. 9 In the twentieth century, civil forfeiture remains one of Con-
gress's favorite weapons against crime. For example, Congress has enacted
forfeiture legislation authorizing the forfeiture of property held by organiza-
tions in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO),90 property used in the violation of the internal revenue laws,91
and adulterated foods transported in interstate commerce.9 2
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court heard numerous cases
brought under federal forfeiture statutes. In those cases, the Court estab-
lished at least three organizing principles of forfeiture law. The first of
these is the relation back doctrine, under which title to a piece of property is
deemed to have vested in the government from the moment of the illegal
act.93 One of the earliest forfeiture cases discussing the relation back doc-
trine was United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh.4 The defendants in this
case had sold a ship they received from Aquilla Brown, who had declared
bankruptcy.95 Unbeknownst to the defendants, Brown falsely swore that he
was the sole owner when he registered the ship.96 However, as Brown
knew, an alien was part owner of the vessel.97 Under federal law, the false
oath rendered the vessel subject to condemnation and forfeiture.98
The critical question in Grundy & Thornburgh was whether title to the
vessel vested immediately in the United States upon the swearing of the
false oath or whether it remained in the owners until the United States took
the necessary legal steps to seize and condemn the vessel.99 The govern-
ment maintained that title to the vessel vested in the United States at the
moment of the false oath and, moreover, that "no sentence of condemnation
was necessary to vest the property in the United States."'100 Rejecting this
89. Act of Feb. 8, 1875, ch. 36, § 16, 18 Stat. 307, 310; see United States v. Stowell, 133
U.s. 1, 12 (1889).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
91. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7301-03 (1988).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1988). For citations to other federal forfeiture statutes, see U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTICE: DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FoRFErruRE OF As-
sETs 11 (1981) [hereinafter DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE], and Lalit K. Loomba, The Innocent Owner
Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 471, 472 n.10 (1989).
93. See Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17; United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 337, 350-51 (1806).
94. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337 (1806).
95. Id. at 349.
96. Id. at 349-50.
97. Id. at 350.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 340 (presenting the arguments of Attorney General Breckinridge).
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argument, the Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice Marshall, dis-
cussed the common-law relation back doctrine and its impact on the forfei-
ture statute at issue:
It has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law,
nothing vests in the government until some legal step shall be
taken for the assertion of its right, after which, for many purposes,
the doctrine of relation carries back the title to the commission of
the offence; but the distinction, taken by the counsel for the
United States, between forfeitures at common law, and those ac-
cruing under a statute, is certainly a sound one. Where a forfei-
ture is given by a statute, the rules of the common law may be
dispensed with, and the thing forfeited may vest immediately, or
on the performance of some particular act, shall [sic] be the will
of the legislature. This must depend on construction of the
statute.101
After examining the text of the statute, the Court held that actual vesting
was not immediate; the government had to take the appropriate legal steps
to secure title to the vessel."0 2 Essentially, the Court declared that vesting
of title at the date of the offense is fictive; a decree of forfeiture is required
to vest title in the government.
101. Id. at 350-51.
102. Id. at 351-54. The actual controversy in Grundy & Thornburgh is difficult to understand
at first glance. The government instituted the action to recover the proceeds from the vessel's
sale. Under the statute, the government apparently had the option to seize the vessel itself or to
sue the individual giving the false oath for its value. Id. at 350. The government had already
seized and libeled the vessel in district court, but the court dismissed the libel because the vessel
was sold without notice to the new owner that the vessel was subject to forfeiture. Id. at 339
(plaintiff's third bill of exception); id. at 345 (arguments by defense counsel).
Aquilla Brown and Harman Henry Hackman, the alien part-owner of the vessel, were bank-
rupt and obviously judgment-proof at this point. See id. at 338 (plaintiff's first bill of exception).
This left the government with only one option, which was to sue Grundy and Thornburgh for the
proceeds of the vessel. See id. at 345 (arguments of defense counsel). However, the statute al-
lowed a proceeding by the government to recover the value of the vessel only against the person
taking the false oath. Id. Thus, to maintain its action against Grundy and Thornburgh, the govern-
ment argued that under the relation back doctrine, title to the vessel vested immediately in the
government upon the taking of the false oath. See id. 340-42 (arguments of Attorney General
Breckinridge). In essence, the government maintained that the proceeds Grundy and Thornburgh
held from the sale of the vessel never belonged to them, but instead belonged to the government.
See id. (arguments of Attorney General Breckinridge).
Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the government's argument depended on the premise
that title to the property vested in the government immediately upon the taking of the false oath.
He undermined that premise by construing the statute to mean that neither title to the vessel nor its
value vested in the government until a decree of forfeiture is entered because logical inconsisten-
cies would arise by assuming otherwise. Id. at 352-53. Chief Justice Marshall held that title to
each remained in their respective owners until election by the United States to proceed against the
owners. Id. at 353-54. He conceded that Congress could pass an act declaring both forfeit imme-
diately, but he held that the act did not provide for immediate vesting of title. Id. at 352. Because
the government could sue only the person who took the false oath for the value of the vessel, this
decision left the government without a party to sue.
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The second principle of forfeiture law the Supreme Court established
in the nineteenth century was that civil forfeiture is a proceeding in rem
against the property the government wishes to seize. By a common-law
fiction, the property itself is treated as the wrongdoer, regardless of whether
its owner is guilty of any wrongdoing. The case of The Palmyra10 3 illus-
trates this principle. In Palmyra, the Court reviewed the seizure and con-
demnation of the vessel Palmyra, a ship described by Justice Story as "an
armed vessel, asserting herself to be a privateer, and acting under a com-
mission of the King of Spain, issued by his authorized officer at the Island
of Porto Rico."" Lieutenant Gregory, captain of the United States warship
Grampus, captured the Palmyra off the coast of South Carolina and brought
her into port to be libeled and condemned in federal court as a vessel en-
gaged in "piratical aggression" on the high seas. 10 5 Responding to an ob-
jection that the vessel could not be seized and condemned without a
corresponding criminal action against the persons engaged in the alleged
"piratical aggression," the Court responded that the forfeiture involved was
a civil in rem proceeding.106 The Court acknowledged that at English com-
mon law, the property of convicted felons was subject to seizure and con-
demnation through the Court of Exchequer as an ancillary penalty."0 7
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the doctrine had never been applied
in civil forfeiture cases; forfeiture on the revenue side of the Court of Ex-
chequer would proceed without a judgment in personam against the prop-
erty's owner. As the Court explained:
The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather
the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether
the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se. The same
principle applies to proceedings in rem on seizures in the Admi-
ralty. Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done at-
taches solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty in
personam.108
The Court also noted that the action in rem is completely "independent of,
and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam."0 9
The third basic principle of civil forfeiture law the Supreme Court an-
nounced in the nineteenth century is somewhat related to the second. In
103. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 15. Justice Story also observed that Congress had not enacted any criminal statute
against piracy and that admitting the defendant's argument would defeat the purpose of the piracy
statute. Id.
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civil forfeiture, the property itself is treated as the wrongdoer. As a result,
the guilt or innocence of the property's owner traditionally has not been a
defense to civil forfeiture. For example, in Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States,110 the government sought the forfeiture of property used by the
claimant's lessee to operate an illegal distillery with the intent to defraud
the government of tax revenues."' Rejecting the landlord's pleas of inno-
cence and lack of knowledge as to his tenant's illegal activities, the Court
held that forfeitures in rem attach to the property sought to be forfeited. 12
Under the statute in question, any real and personal property used in viola-
tion of the statute was charged with the offense "without any regard what-
soever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner."' 13
Accordingly, the real property was forfeited to the government even though
the lessor had no knowledge of his lessee's illegal activities.
Despite the Marshall Court's apparent belief that the relation back doc-
trine was fictive, the Court took a different stance on that doctrine in United
States v. Stowell." 4 In Stowell, the Court construed a statute that declared
forfeit illegal distilled spirits, wines, stills, and the property upon which
they were found, but exempted the interest of any party who did not have
knowledge of the illegal distillery and did not participate in its operation. "'5
One of the questions the Court addressed was the extent of Stowell's inter-
est in the real property in question." 6 Stowell took a mortgage subject to a
pre-existing mortgage from Dixon, the owner of the property, who later
began operating an illegal distillery upon the property. 17 Sometime after
setting up the distillery, Dixon failed to pay the debt for which he gave the
mortgage to Stowell." 8 Instead of foreclosing, Dixon gave Stowell a quit-
claim deed that purported to convey his equity of redemption to Stowell.19
Deciding the extent of Stowell's interest in the property, the Court repeated
the common articulation of the relation back doctrine.120 First, the Court
observed that a forfeiture prescribed by statute vests title to the property in
the government upon commission of the illegal act, even though that title is
not perfected until the government obtains a judicial decree of forfeiture. 2 '
Additionally, the Court noted that when the decree is obtained, title relates
110. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
111. Id. at 396-97.
112. Id. at 399-401.
113. Id. at401.
114. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
115. Id. at 12, 14-15.
116. Id. at 18-20.
117. Id. at 4, 19.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id.
120. ld. at 16-17.
121. Id.
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back to the time of the illegal act, cutting off all subsequent transfers, even
to good faith purchasers.12
The Court reasoned that the forfeiture in Stowell took effect when
Dixon set up his illegal distillery.' 23 At that moment, all of Dixon's right
and title to the land vested in the government as though he had deeded his
interest to the government; no subsequent conveyance of the land could
defeat the government's interest.' 24 Thus, according to the Stowell Court,
forfeiture did not divest Stowell of his lien on the property, but it did pre-
vent Dixon from transferring title to the property to Stowell."z Therefore,
upon the act giving rise to the forfeiture, the United States took Dixon's
interest in the property subject to Stowell's mortgage. 26
In the twentieth century, while upholding and applying forfeiture stat-
utes enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court periodically manifested some
resistance to their broad effect and tendency to ensnare unsuspecting inno-
cent parties.' 27 For example, when ruling on a question of remission of a
forfeiture in United States v. One Ford Coach,'28 the Court declared that
"[florfeitures are not favored [and] they should be enforced only when
122. By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that upon the com-
mission of a certain act specific property used in or connected with that act shall be
forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act; the
right to the property then vests in the United States, although their title is not perfected
until judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to
the United States at the time the offence is committed; and the condemnation, when
obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations,
even to purchasers in good faith.
Id. Courts on both sides of the relation back debate have cited this passage to support their
respective positions. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
123. Stowell, 133 U.S. at 19.
124. According to the Court:
As soon as a still was set up on the land... the forfeiture... took effect, and (though
needing judicial condemnation to perfect it) operated from that time as a statutory con-
veyance to the United States of all the right, title and interest then remaining in the
mortgagor; and was as valid and effectual, against all the world, as a recorded deed.
The right so vested in the United States could not be defeated or impaired by any subse-
quent dealings of the mortgagee with the mortgagor.
Id. (citation omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 20.
127. The Drug Enforcement Agency, in its alacrity to enforce civil forfeiture law to the great-
est extent possible, made this disparaging comment about the tendency of the courts to ameliorate
the law's effect:
In spite of the ancient rules, and in spite of the executive branch's pardoning power,
there have always been judges and juries that refuse to follow the law. Unable to accept
the harshness of forfeiting a non-negligent person's property, and unwilling to accept
the pardon decisions of the executive branches of government, they have either defied or
"bent" the law to prevent forfeiture.
DRUG AGENrs' GuIDE, supra note 92, at 40.
128. 307 U.S. 219 (1939).
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within both letter and spirit of the law." '129 The Court also indicated that
forfeiture laws, when viewed as a whole, are intended to penalize only
those individuals "who are significantly involved in a criminal enter-
prise." 3 Nevertheless, the Court has observed that the institution of forfei-
ture is entrenched too firmly in the jurisprudence of our country to be
rejected now as wholly unconstitutional. 31
Because the Court had refused to declare congressional use of the civil
forfeiture mechanism unconstitutional per se, Congress was free to press
civil forfeiture law into service once again in 1970 as a weapon in its fight
against drug abuse. As part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, Congress enacted civil forfeiture provisions declaring for-
feit certain categories of drug-related contraband and controlled sub-
stances.' 32 The statute made forfeit to the government all controlled
substances "manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired" in violation
of the Act,'33 as well as containers 34 and materials used to produce the
controlled substances, 135 conveyances used or intended to be used to trans-
port the contraband,' 36 and documents and other recordings used or in-
tended to be used in violation of the Act.137 Congress's intent in passing
civil forfeiture legislation against controlled substances and related contra-
band was, in the words of Senator Robert Byrd, to impose "heavy economic
sanctions on [the] predatory business practices [of drug traffickers and to
serve as] a mighty deterrent to any further expansion of organized crime's
economic power."'13
8
Although Congress included an innocent owner exception in
§ 881(a)(4)-excluding from forfeiture conveyances that were unlawfully
in the possession of another at the time the act giving rise to forfeiture was
129. Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
130. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971) (holding
that a claimant may invoke the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination in a civil
forfeiture proceeding).
131. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (holding that federal tax
law forfeiture scheme did not unconstitutionally deprive an innocent claimant of property in con-
travention of the Fifth Amendment).
132. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV)).
133. Id. § 511(a)(1).
134. Id. § 511(a)(3).
135. Id. § 511(a)(2).
136. Id. § 511(a)(4). In enacting this section, Congress specifically exempted conveyances
owned by common carriers unless the "owner or other person in charge of [the] conveyance"
knew or consented to the violation of the Act. Id. § 511 (a)(4)(A). Congress also exempted from
forfeiture conveyances that were stolen from their owners and subsequently used in violation of
the Act. Id. § 511(a)(4)(B).
137. Id. § 511(a)(5); see also H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4623-24 (explaining § 511).
138. See Jankowski, supra note 20, at 167 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 67(1970).
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committed-that exception plainly did not cover conveyances lawfully in
the possession of others, such as bailments of conveyances. 139 This over-
sight set the stage for a constitutional battle over whether a conveyance
belonging to a truly innocent person constitutionally could be declared for-
feited to the government because of acts committed by another while the
conveyance was lawfully in another's possession.
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,140 the Court faced
this issue for the first time. The act in question was Puerto Rico's seizure,
pursuant to a territorial civil forfeiture statute modeled after § 881, of a
yacht that had been leased by Pearson Yacht to persons who brought mari-
juana on board.' 4 1 The issue the Court confronted was whether Puerto Rico
unconstitutionally deprived Pearson Yacht of due process by authorizing
seizure without notice and pre-seizure hearing and deprived the claimant of
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 142
The Court rejected the claimant's challenge that the lack of pre-seizure no-
tice deprived it of due process. 143 In an opinion written by Justice Brennan,
the Court concluded that even its prior case law recognized that, in "ex-
traordinary" situations, seizure of property without pre-seizure notice or
hearing is permissible; forfeiture, continued the Court, is just such an ex-
traordinary situation.'" Also, the Court did not accept that simply because
a statute renders the property of innocent persons subject to forfeiture, the
statute is thereby unconstitutional because it deprives those persons of their
property without just compensation. 145
139. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. No. 91-513,
§ 51 1(a)(4)(B), 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(B) (1988)). In
1988, Congress remedied the inequitable situation created by this part of § 881 by amending
subsection (a)(4) to exempt from forfeiture interests in conveyances held by owners whose con-
veyances were used in violation of the Act "without [their] knowledge, consent, or willful blind-
ness." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 6075(3), § 511 (a)(4)(C), 102
Stat. 4181, 4324 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988)).
140. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
141. Id. at 686 n.25.
142. Id. at 668. Indeed, Pearson Yacht did not discover that the government of Puerto Rico
had seized its vessel until it attempted to repossess the vessel from the lessees because of their
failure to pay rent. Id.
143. Id. at 663, 690. Pearson Yacht challenged the constitutionality of Puerto Rico's seizure
of its vessel under Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972), in which the Court declared uncon-
stitutional two replevin statutes from Florida and Pennsylvania because they denied property own-
ers pre-seizure notice and a hearing. See Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 678.
144. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 678-80.
145. Id. at 680. However, in dicta, the Court indicated the circumstances under which it might
be unconstitutional to seize and condemn the property of an innocent person under a forfeiture
scheme:
Similarly, [it might be difficult to dismiss the constitutional claim] of an owner who
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use
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Although Congress had high hopes that forfeiture law would be a pow-
erful weapon in the "war on drugs," by 1978, Congress discovered that the
existing civil forfeiture scheme was not accomplishing what it had envi-
sioned. Consequently, there was a call to expand the scope of property
subject to forfeiture under the Act.'46 As part of the Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1978, Congress enacted § 881(a)(6), which declared forfeit
to the government assets traceable to drug transactions.14 In this instance,
of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture
served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Id. at 689-90. Because § 881(a)(4)(C) now exempts from forfeiture interests in conveyances
owned by persons with no knowledge of illegal uses to which their conveyances have been put,
Congress clearly has manifested its preference for an "actual knowledge" standard in lieu of a
"reasonable precautions" standard. Therefore, the need to embark on the sort of constitutional
analysis suggested by Pearson Yacht is diminished. See Jankowski, supra note 20, at 188-93.
In a recent decision, the Court has undercut significantly the effect of Pearson Yacht in
situations involving the forfeiture of real property. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993), the Court considered whether the government had denied due
process to the owner of real property the government had seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1988) without affording him pre-seizure notice and a hearing. Id. at 497. The government main-
tained that the Fourth Amendment governed the extent of the process it owes when seizing real
property and, in the alternative, that seizure under the narcotics forfeiture laws is an "extraordi-
nary" situation that warrants postponement of notice and a hearing. Id. The Court, in an opinion
delivered by Justice Kennedy, held that the Fourth Amendment does not govern the extent of the
process the government owes the owners of seized real property. Id. at 498. In accordance with
Pearson Yacht, the government also must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 500. However, the Court held that seizure of real property under the civil
forfeiture laws is not an "extraordinary" situation that requires the postponement of the normal
incidents of due process. Id. at 501. Applying the three-part due process analysis announced in
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court held that owners of real property have a
strong interest in enjoying their property free from government intervention. Good, 114 S. Ct. at
501-03. Furthermore, the Court noted that ex parte seizures of real property "[create] an unac-
ceptable risk of error" by increasing the chances that innocent persons will be deprived of their
property contrary to congressional intent. Id. at 501. Lastly, the Court explained that the govern-
ment's interest in immediate action is not strong enough to justify an ex parte seizure in large part
because real property, unlike the vessel involved in Pearson Yacht, is not likely to leave the
jurisdiction. Id. at 502. The Court maintained that the government has other means at its disposal
to preserve the property for eventual forfeiture, such as filing a lis pendens with the local register
of deeds or obtaining a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction pursuant to FED. R.
Civ. P. 65. Id. at 503. Indeed, in the vast number of real property seizure cases, the government's
intent is only to assert its interest in the property and not to preserve it for forfeiture. See id. To
seize real property without affording pre-seizure notice and a hearing, the government must
demonstrate that "less restrictive measures ... would not suffice to protect the Government's
interests." Id. at 505.
146. See Alice M. O'Brien, "Caught in the Crossfire": Protecting the Innocent Owner of
Real Property from Civil Forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 521, 526
(1991).
147. Section 301 of the Act amended § 511(a) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)) of the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 by adding the following section:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in viola-
tion of this title, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
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Congress took the novel approach of including a provision expressly ex-
empting from forfeiture the interests of persons whose property was used in
a drug transaction without their "knowledge or consent."' 4 8 The joint state-
ment explaining the new section indicates that Congress intended it to have
broad application in order to protect the interests of all innocent owners. 149
The debate on the Senate floor also establishes Congress's intention that the
scope of the exception be especially broad.15
In 1984, Congress again amended § 881 as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984. In addition to adding a provision enabling the
government to seize and condemn real property used in drug transac-
tions,15 Congress added subsection (h) to § 881. Subsection (h) declared
that all right and title to "property described in subsection (a)" vested "in
the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
title, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, sec. 301(a)(1), § 511(a)(6), 92 Stat.
3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)).
148. See supra note 147.
149. The statement suggests that
[t]he term "owner" should be broadly interpreted to include any person with a recogniz-
able legal or equitable interest in the property seized. Specifically the property would
not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property knew or consented to the
fact that:
1. the property was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of law,
2. the property was proceeds traceable to such an illegal exchange, or
3. the property was used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of Federal
illicit drug laws.
Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 124 CONG. REc. 17,647 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23.
150. During his remarks on the Senate floor, Senator John Culver made these statements about
the innocent owner exception:
In the subcommittee, concerns were expressed over the breadth of the provisions of [the
new section]. Specifically, it was noted that the original language could have been
construed to reach properties traceable to the illegal proceeds but obtained by an inno-
cent party without knowledge of the manner in which the proceeds were obtained. The
original language is modified in the proposed amendment in order to protect the individ-
ual who obtains ownership of proceeds with no knowledge of the illegal transaction.
124 CONG. REc. 23,056 (1978) (emphasis added).
Senator Sam Nunn echoed Senator Culver's sentiments concerning this part of § 881(a)(6):
We did add a provision in the modification to make it clear that a bona fide party who
has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been derived from an
illegal transaction, that party would be able to establish that fact under this amendment
and forfeiture would not occur.
124 CoNG. REc. 23,057 (1978).
151. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 306(a), § 511(a)(7),
98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
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.... ,"152 The legislative history indicates that Congress regarded this prin-
ciple as "well established in current law."1" 3
Since its passage, a distinct body of law has developed around § 881
and, in particular, the innocent owner exceptions of §§ 881(a)(6) and
881(a)(7). The procedure for seizing and condemning property forfeit to
the government under § 881 is governed by the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims and the procedures for adjudicating
violations of the customs laws.154 Like civil forfeiture at common law, a
forfeiture proceeding under § 881 is an action in rem against the property
sought to be condemned. 155 Forfeiture proceedings are commenced upon
the filing of a verified complaint.1 56 The government bears the initial bur-
den of showing probable cause that the property seized is subject to forfei-
ture. 157 After meeting its initial burden, any claimants must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture
or that they are "innocent owners" within the meaning of §§ 881(a)(6) or
152. Id. § 306(f), § 511(h).
153. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3398.
154. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), (d) (1988). The Supplemental Rules are part of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and are found at 28 U.S.C. Rules A-F (1988 & Supp. IV). The procedures for
adjudicating violations of the customs laws are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-18 (1988 & Supp.
IV). See generally AYLESWORTH, supra note 38, at 7-26 (outlining the basic procedures for seiz-
ing and condemning real property); 1 SMrrH, supra note 2, 10.01-11.08, at 10-1 to 11-29
(discussing the procedure applying in civil forfeiture cases); G. Richard Strafer, Civil Forfeitures:
Protecting the Innocent Owner, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 841, 848-60 (1985) (discussing and analyzing
the procedures for civil forfeiture).
155. See 28 U.S.C. Rule C (1988 & Supp. IV); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S.
663, 679 (1974). Although the legal fiction is that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing, the
property is denied status as a "person!' under the Constitution and is therefore not entitled to the
constitutional rights afforded to "persons." E.g., United States v. Rod and Reel Fish Camp, 831
F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that property has no standing to contest its own forfei-
ture and that only "owners" who are "persons" may challenge the forfeiture).
156. 28 U.S.C. Rule C(2) (1988).
157. E.g., United States v. 2511 E. Fairmont Ave., 722 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (D. Md. 1989);
see 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). Probable cause is a reasonable belief that the property is subject to
forfeiture; it is less than prima facie proof, but more than a mere suspicion. E.g., United States v.
427 Chestnut St., 731 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1990). Hearsay is admissible to demonstrate
the existence of probable cause. See United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the
Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing cases); 1 Surrn, supra note 2, 1.03[5], at
11-18 to 11-21.
Legislation introduced by Representative Henry Hyde, which is currently before Congress
would amend § 1615 to require the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question is subject to forfeiture. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, H.R.
2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1993); see infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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(a)(7).' I5 Claimants are entitled to trial by jury in forfeiture proceedings, in
accordance with the Seventh Amendment. 59
To have standing to contest a forfeiture, a claimant must demonstrate
an interest in the property. 160 Bare assertion of ownership or mere legal
title without exercise of dominion and control over the property may be
insufficient to establish standing. 6 ' However, lesser property interests
such as possession, can create standing. 62  Although only "owners" can
contest forfeiture, 63 the courts must broadly construe the term, in accord-
ance with congressional intent, to include any claimant with a legal or equi-
table interest in the property."6
The dispute in 92 Buena Vista Avenue resulted from the intersection of
the relation back doctrine of the common law and § 881(h), and the inno-
cent owner defenses of §§ 881(a)(6) and 881(a)(7). The question arising
from the conflict between these two doctrines is whether a person who pur-
ports to take an interest in property subject to forfeiture after the illegal act
giving rise to the forfeiture has standing to invoke the "innocent owner"
defense. The controversy percolated in the circuits for years, and the cir-
cuits remained divided on the issue until 92 Buena Vista Avenue. Many
courts agreed with the government that the relation back doctrine was to be
taken seriously, that all title to the property actually vested in the govern-
ment upon the commission of the illegal act, and that no one thereafter
could acquire any interest in the property.165 Other courts resisted the gov-
158. E.g., United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983); 427 Chestnut St., 731
F. Supp. at 189.
159. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 458-68 (7th Cir.
1980) (detailing the history of jury trials in civil forfeiture proceedings in rem).
160. E.g., United States v. $38,570 in United States Currency, 950 F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir.
1992).
161. E.g., id. at 1112-13; United States v. 5000 Palmetto Dr., 928 F.2d 373, 375 (11th Cir.
1991); United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
5860 N. Bay Rd., 121 F.R.D. 439,440 (S.D. Fla. 1988). This rule prevents so-called "strawmen,"
to whom criminals often transfer their assets to shield them from the government, from challeng-
ing civil forfeiture actions. See 1 SMrrH, supra note 2, 9.04[2][b][i], at 9-58.11 to 9-58.13.
162. E.g., United States v. 1982 Sanger 24' Spectra Boat, 738 F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir.
1984).
163. E.g., United States v. Rod and Reel Fish Camp, 831 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1987).
164. E.g., United States v. Lot 61, Tract #2, 3-D Estates, 762 F. Supp. 1478, 1483 (N.D. Ga.
1991).
165. E.g., United States v. Ford 250 Pickup 1990, 980 F.2d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that transfers subsequent to the act giving rise to forfeiture are invalid); United States v.
United States Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d Cir.) (holding that a
claimant "had no property interest in the money as of [the] moment [he committed the crime]"),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 958 (1990); United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that forfeiture occurs at the time of the illegal act even though seizure does not occur
until later); In re One 1985 Nissan, 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1321 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
wrongdoer could not give good title to anyone after the illegal act, nor could his heirs claim an
interest in the property after his death); Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242, 247-48 (10th Cir.
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ernment's interpretation of the relation back doctrine by holding that title to
the property does not vest in the government until a decree of forfeiture;
accordingly, in those circuits, subsequent purchasers could invoke the inno-
cent owner defense.166 These courts enlisted a variety of rationales in
reaching this result.' 6 7 The acrimony in the circuits over the extent of the
1989) (holding that the government's title to property vests upon obtaining a decree of forfeiture,
that title relates back to the time of the commission of the illegal act cutting off the interests of
"subsequent lienholders and purchasers," and that the innocent owner exception may be invoked
only by "owners" whose interests vested prior to the time of the illegal act giving rise to forfei-
ture), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency and Travelers
Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (1Ith Cir. 1986) (holding that illegal use vests title in the United
States immediately and cuts off third parties from obtaining "legally protectable interests in the
property"); United States v. 10652 S. Laramie, 779 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding
that title vests in the property on the date of the illegal act even though the property has yet to be
seized and that third parties may not acquire any interest in the property after that date); United
States v. 2511 E. Fairmont Ave., 722 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that "subse-
quent heirs or donees" of property subject to forfeiture must yield to the government's superior
interest in the property); United States v. Rod and Reel Fish Camp, 660 F. Supp. 483, 487 (S.D.
Miss. 1987) (holding that a claimant's interest in the property must have existed prior to the act
giving rise to the forfeiture because of the "well established" principle that title to the property
vests in the government at the time of the illegal act), aff'd on other grounds, 831 F.2d 566 (5th
Cir. 1987).
166. E.g., United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 385 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the
government's ownership at the time of the illegal act was "fictive" and not perfected until judg-
ment of forfeiture was entered); United States v. Kingsley, 851 F.2d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1988)
(' Title reverts only after forfeiture is effected, and in the criminal context that is only after a
conviction and determination that the assets were the product of illicit activities."); United States
v. One 56-foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the government's title to the property is not established until it has complied with the statuto-
rily mandated forfeiture procedures); see also Western Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant,
730 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding in accord with Tahuna that title is not vested in
the government until it has complied with the statutory forfeiture procedures). The Ninth Circuit's
holdings in the area of civil forfeiture law have been especially protective of the rights of innocent
owners, and accordingly, that circuit has angered the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Depart-
ment of Justice:
If the Pearson Yacht Company could revive its claim and bring it before federal courts
within the Ninth Circuit, it would today be granted the relief that it was just denied a
few years ago by the United States Supreme Court. Historically, the judicial rebellion
against the forfeiture doctrine is alive and well in the federal courts within the Ninth
Circuit.
DRUG AGmrrs' GUIDE, supra note 92, at 42. True to form, the Ninth Circuit provided the
Supreme Court with its most recent opportunity to curtail the government's aggressive use of civil
forfeiture law. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.
1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
167. In his article, Jankowski discusses at least three methods courts have used to minimize
the effect of the relation back doctrine on third-party post-seizure interest holders. The first
method has been to protect, to varying degrees, third-party interests existing at the time the illegal
acts took place (for example, mortgagees and lienholders). Jankowski, supra note 20, at 178-81.
Another method has been to interpret the applicable forfeiture statute as permissive and not requir-
ing immediate forfeiture to the government. Id. at 181-83; see also United States v. $13,000 in
United States Currency, 733 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing the permissive nature of
§ 881). The final method has been to interpret broadly the innocent owner protections of
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relation back doctrine and its bearing on the innocent owner defense led the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to 92 Buena Vista Avenue.168
The government contended in 92 Buena Vista Avenue that the relation
back doctrine-in its common-law form and as manifested in § 881(h)-
prevented Goodwin from acquiring an interest in the money Brenna trans-
ferred to her.' 69 Addressing that argument, both the plurality, led by Justice
Stevens, and two concurring justices, Justices Scalia and Thomas, recog-
nized that the Court was required to determine two things: the correct for-
mulation of the relation back doctrine as developed through its case law and
whether Congress intended to supplant the common-law rule when it en-
acted § 881(h). 17 0 In deciding that the common-law relation back doctrine
is fictive, the plurality relied on two key cases: United States v. Grundy &
Thornburgh7' and United States v. Stowell.'72 According to the plurality,
both cases illustrate that the relation back doctrine is "fictional [and not]
self-executing."' 73 However, the cases appear to formulate two different
versions of the relation back doctrine-a dichotomy that may be responsi-
ble for the confusion among the circuits over the correct formulation of the
relation back doctrine.
In the plurality opinion, to support his conclusion that the relation back
doctrine is fictive, Justice Stevens first quoted Chief Justice Marshall's
statement in Grundy & Thornburgh that "nothing vests in the government
until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion of its right."'17 4 Next,
he invoked a commonly cited passage from Stowell in which the Court
stated that "forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the
[illegal] act [and] the right to the property then vests in the United States,
although their title is not perfected until judicial condemnation."'75 Justice
Stevens then argued that this premise, in conjunction with Chief Justice
Marshall's statement in Grundy &.Thornburgh, stands for the following
proposition:
If the Government wins a judgment of forfeiture under the com-
mon law rule-which applied to common-law forfeitures and to
§ 881(a)(6) and § 881(a)(7), Jankowski, supra note 20, at 183-88. The Supreme Court apparently
adopted this last approach in 92 Buena Vista Ave.
168. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1131 (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 1134 (plurality opinion).
170. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35 (plurality opinion), at 1138-39 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
171. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337 (1806).
172. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
173. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1135 (plurality opinion).
174. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
337, 350-51 (1806)); see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
175. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v.
Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890)).
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forfeitures under statutes without specific relation back provi-
sions-the vesting of its title in the property relates back to the
moment when the property became forfeitable. Until the Govern-
ment does win such a judgment, however, someone else owns the
property. That person may therefore invoke any defense available
to the owner of the property before the forfeiture is decreed.
176
Although the Grundy & Thornburgh Court clearly believed that the relation
back doctrine was fictive, and while the passage quoted from Stowell is
susceptible to the same interpretation, the Stowell Court appears to have
considered the relation back doctrine to be self-executing. In determining
whether the operator of the illegal distillery's quitclaim deed was effective
to convey the equity of redemption to the deed holder, 177 the Stowell Court
clearly believed that because the conveyance occurred after the property
was used to operate the distillery, it was not effective to transfer the equity
of redemption via the deed. 17  The Stowell Court's interpretation of the
relation back doctrine is thus consistent with the government's
interpretation.
The Stowell passage quoted by the plurality in 92 Buena Vista Avenue
appears to be the source of the disagreement among the circuits. Courts on
both sides of the relation back issue have cited this passage to support their
respective positions. 179 Still, while this passage can be read to support
either version of the relation back doctrine, the remainder of the Stowell
opinion demonstrates that the Court believed that, under the doctrine, title
to the property vested in the government immediately. Thus, Justice Ste-
vens's reliance on this passage appears to be misplaced. However, Stow-
eli's articulation of the relation back doctrine also is not reconcilable with
Chief Justice Marshall's articulation in Grundy & Thornburgh or with other
176. Id. (plurality opinion).
177. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
178. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1889). After considering the language of the
forfeiture statute before it, the Stowell Court determined Congress's intent to be that the "forfei-
ture of land and buildings shall not reach beyond the right, title and interest of the distiller." Id. at
14. Yet, the Court also apparently considered the relation back doctrine to vest title to the prop-
erty held by the distiller in the government immediately, thus invalidating any subsequent convey-
ances. Id. at 19. As a result, the Court believed that the government took title to the property
subject to Stowell's mortgage and that Dixon's quitclaim deed was ineffective to merge Stowell's
mortgage and the equity of redemption. Id. at 19-20.
179. Compare United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276,
1279 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17, as supporting its conclusion that "It]he
government's legal title is not established until after it has complied with the forfeiture procedures
mandated by statute") and Western Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280,
1287 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17, as supporting the proposition that "forfei-
ture must be 'consummated' by a judgment or decree of a court") with Eggleston v. Colorado, 873
F.2d 242, 245-46 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Stowell, 133 U.S. at 16-17, as supporting its conclu-
sion that "section 881, on its face, provides for immediate forfeiture to the government at the time
the illegal act is committed"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
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Supreme Court articulations of the doctrine.' ° In light of the problems
with this case and the confusion it has caused, the Court should have specif-
ically overruled Stowell to the extent that its interpretation and application
of the relation back doctrine is inconsistent with its holding in 92 Buena
Vista Avenue. In any event, Stowell's value as precedent is extremely dubi-
ous in light of the Court's recent decision.
After concluding that the common-law version of the relation back
doctrine is "fictive" in nature, Justice Stevens turned to § 881(h) to deter-
mine if it supplants the common-law rule by vesting title immediately or if
it merely "codifie[s] the common-law rule."18 After reviewing the text of
the statute, he concluded that Congress simply codified the common-law
rule. ' 2 This interpretation of § 881(h) appears to be correct in light of the
statute's scant legislative history. 8 3 The Senate Report accompanying the
bill states that the principle embodied in § 881(h) was "well established in
current law."' 4 The report indicates no intention on the part of Congress to
alter the common-law relation back doctrine, rather the report indicates an
intent to codify it.' 85
180. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1138-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting cases demonstrating that the relation back doctrine is "fictive").
181. Id. at 1136 (plurality opinion).
182. Id. (plurality opinion).
183. Congress enacted § 881(h) as part of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, which
Congress considered separately and also as a part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. The Senate passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act by a vote of 91 to 1 on February
2, 1984, see 130 CoNG. REc. 1587 (1984), and the Senate passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act the next day, see id. at 1827-30 (1984). However, neither piece of legislation was reported
out of committee in the House. See id. at 26,780. Eventually, the House attached the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act to H.J. Res. 648, one of the so-called "Continuing Resolutions" used
several times by Congress during the Reagan Administration at the eleventh hour to make appro-
priations to keep the government operating, despite protests of some members about the lack of
adequate time to debate the bill. See id. at 26,834 (remarks of Rep. Lungren). As one court
commented: "This Act was passed so hastily that the use of the term 'comprehensive' in its title is
more aspirational than descriptive." Eggleston v. Colorado, 636 F. Supp. 1312, 1315 (D. Colo.
1986), rev'd, 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
184. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 153, at 215, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3398.
185. Of course, to the extent that it believed the common-law relation back doctrine was self-
executing, Congress, as 92 Buena Vista Ave. demonstrates, was mistaken.
Although the relation back doctrine can no longer be used to cut off the interests of subse-
quent property owners, it still can be used, once a court has entered a decree of forfeiture, to
obtain rents, profits, and interests derived from use of the property from the date of the illegal act.
See, e.g., Braxton v. United States, 858 F.2d 650, 655 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that under Florida
law, the federal government was entitled to collect "mesne profits" from the owner of forfeited
property for occupying the land without the government's permission); cf Allison Dunham, Pos-
sibility of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CH. L.
REv. 215, 218 (1953) (stating that upon the breach of an estate subject to a special limitation-
otherwise known as a fee simple determinable-the holder of the possibility of reverter is entitled
to damages for waste and recovery of "mesne profits" from the time of termination).
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Justice Stevens's next argument was the source of the disagreement
between the plurality and Justice Scalia. Because the common-law doctrine
never applied to forfeitures of proceeds and because, unlike previous forfei-
ture statutes, § 881(a)(6) contains an innocent owner defense, the plurality
argued that it is not clear whether the common-law relation back doctrine
and § 881(h) yield the same result.18 6 Justice Stevens focused on the phrase
in § 881(h) stating that title to "property described in subsection (a)" vests
in the United States upon commission of the illegal act. 187 Juxtaposing that
phrase with the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(6), he argued that
§ 881(a)(6) must be applied before § 881(h) can be applied. 88 Conse-
quently, the plurality concluded that § 881(h) should be interpreted to mean
that property held by innocent owners is not subject to forfeiture. 189 Justice
Scalia, in contrast, argued that the plurality "beg[ged] the question" by
concluding that, since § 881(a)(6) must be applied before § 88 1(h), the term
"owner" includes persons who had title to the property prior to the decree of
forfeiture. 9 He maintained that the innocent owner defense does not pre-
vent forfeiture of the property itself, but instead protects the property inter-
ests of innocent owners.'91
Justice Scalia's distinction between the property that is subject to for-
feiture and the interest in that property held by an innocent owner is sound,
and it exposes a weakness in the plurality's argument. The very issue in
this case was whether Goodwin qualified as an "owner" of the property for
purposes of § 881(a)(6). The plurality assumed that question away by
maintaining that "property described in subsection (a)" does not include
property held by innocent owners. The plurality's analysis is inadequate for
186. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1136 (plurality opinion).
187. Id. (plurality opinion).
188. Id. at 1136-37 (plurality opinion).
189. Id. (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra notes 66-67 and accompa-
nying text.
191. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). To
illustrate Justice Scalia's point, consider the common situation in which a husband and wife own a
house as tenants by the entirety. One of the spouses uses the property to conduct a drug traffick-
ing operation without the knowledge or consent of the other spouse. The government then seizes
the property and files a forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988), which contains the
same innocent owner defense provided in § 881(a)(6). What rights does the innocent spouse have
to the property upon establishing her innocence? Courts that have dealt with the issue apparently
agree that the interest of the innocent spouse is exempt from forfeiture, but exactly how that
interest is to be respected is the source of considerable disagreement. Compare United States v.
1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 78 (3rd Cir. 1991) (holding that, upon forfeiture of husband's
interest, innocent wife retains right to exclusive possession and use of the property, protection
against conveyance without consent, and the right to the fee if her husband predeceases her) with
United States v. South 23.19 Acres of Land, 694 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (E.D. La. 1988) (holding
that husband's forfeited interest was community property under Louisiana law and therefore the
government was entitled to a sale of the property, with one half of the proceeds going to the wife).
1358 [Vol. 72
1994] FORFEITURE & DRUG CONTROL 1359
several reasons. First, courts have treated the innocent owner defense as an
affirmative defense to forfeiture.192 The fact that probable cause exists to
believe that proceeds are traceable to a drug transaction is arguably what
makes property "subject to forfeiture" under § 881(a)(6). The innocent
owner defense is effectively a concession that the property is subject to
forfeiture by being so tainted, but that the government may not extinguish
the interest of the innocent owner because he had no knowledge that the
property was in fact tainted. 193 Secondly, as noted earlier, Congress in-
tended that the term "owner" in § 881(a)(6) be interpreted broadly "to in-
clude any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the
property seized."'194 Even if the relation back doctrine operated immedi-
ately to prevent her from acquiring legal title, Goodwin would have held
some interest in the property, even if only an equitable one, which would
entitle her to protection under the innocent owner exception.' 9 5
Although Justice Scalia's interpretation of the statute is the more accu-
rate of the two, the disagreement is not fatal to the Court's holding. Be-
cause the relation back doctrine is fictive, whoever holds an interest, legal
or equitable, in the property continues to hold that interest and thus is enti-
tled to invoke the innocent owner defense. Practically, whether the "prop-
erty described in subsection (a)" includes property held by innocent owners
192. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
193. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 79, at 60 (defining "affirmative defense"); cf.
Brown v. Ehlert, 841 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1992) ('The essence of affirmative defenses is to
concede that while the plaintiff otherwise may have a good cause of action, the cause of action no
longer exists because some statute or rule permits defendant to avoid liability for the acts
alleged.").
194. Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, supra note 149, at 17,647, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9522-23.
195. Cf. United States v. Kingsley, 851 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[Sleized property is in a
kind of limbo-belonging totally to neither the defendant nor the government until the underlying
criminal matter is finally concluded."). In this sense, Goodwin's equitable interest might rest on
the fact that if the government failed to make out a case for forfeiture, she would be the legal
owner of the property as the holder of record title.
Justice Scalia recognized that the government's position on the effect of the relation back
doctrine not only would bar subsequent purchasers from invoking the innocent owner defense, but
also would bar individuals holding interests at the time of the illegal act; those persons would be,
at best, "former owners." 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). However, the government's position would both prevent subsequent purchasers from
invoking the innocent owner defense and conceivably deprive anyone, including persons who held
interests at the time of the illegal act, of standing to contest the forfeiture, since standing requires
that a claimant be an "owner" with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property. See
supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text. Accordingly, no one would ever have standing to
challenge even the government's showing of probable cause. As the Ninth Circuit observed,
"[tihe government's argument, while superficially appealing, is based on the very conclusion the
forfeiture proceeding is designed to reach." United States v. One 56-foot Motor Yacht Named the
Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, the government's position would result in an
intolerable denial of even the most basic due process rights by denying everyone standing to
contest the government's forfeiture action.
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is irrelevant; under either interpretation, subsequent interest holders are en-
titled to invoke the innocent owner defense.
Writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the law of voidable
title controls whether a party is entitled to invoke the innocent owner excep-
tion.'9 6 Under the law of voidable title as codified in section 2-403 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, a person who receives goods through a "trans-
action of purchase" under certain "fraudulent" circumstances19 7 obtains
"voidable title."'198 The holder of voidable title then has the power to trans-
fer good title to a "good faith purchaser for value."'199 Although section 1-
201(32) of the Uniform Commercial Code defines a purchaser as one who
"[takes] by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-
issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in prop-
erty,"2°° a purchaser taking by gift does not give value for the property and,
therefore, acquires only the voidable title held by the donor.20 1 In arguing
that the law of voidable title applies to civil forfeiture cases, Justice Ken-
nedy implicitly maintained that the illegal act renders the wrongdoer's title
in the property voidable by the government. Applying the law of voidable
title to this case, Justice Kennedy concluded that, because Goodwin gave no
consideration for the $216,000 Brenna sent to her, she acquired only his
voidable title.2" 2 As a result, the government was entitled to extinguish her
interest and take good title to the property.203
Although Justice Kennedy's analysis under the law of voidable title is
accurate, his initial premise that the law of voidable title applies in civil
forfeiture cases under § 881(a)(6) is seemingly incorrect under either inter-
196. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. Those circumstances include the following situations: "the transferor was deceived as to
the identity of the purchaser," "the delivery was in exchange for a check which [was] later dis-
honored," "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale,'" or "the delivery was pro-
cured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law." U.C.C. § 2-403(l)(a)-(d),
IA U.L.A. 703 (1989).
198. A superficial objection to Justice Kennedy's argument is that the Uniform Commercial
Code, including § 2-403, applies only to transactions in goods, whereas 92 Buena Vista Ave.
involved real property. Nevertheless, the objection does not damage Justice Kennedy's position.
He did not argue that § 2-403 should apply to forfeiture law; rather, he argued that the law of
voidable title, a common-law concept embodied in § 2-403, should apply in forfeiture law. See 92
Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
403 is a convenient embodiment of the common-law doctrine of voidable title, to which commen-
tators on forfeiture law sometimes refer when discussing the law of voidable title or advocating its
application to forfeiture law. See, e.g., Jankowski, supra note 20, at 188.
199. U.C.C. § 2-403(1), 1A U.L.A. 703 (1989).
200. Id. § 1-201(32) & (33), 1 U.L.A. 66 (1989) (emphasis added). Section 1-201(33) defines
"purchaser" as "one who takes by purchase."
201. See id. § 2-403(1), IA U.L.A. 703 (1989) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which
his transferor had or had power to transfer ....").
202. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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pretation of the relation back doctrine. 2" First, if the relation back doctrine
were self-executing, as the government maintained, not even bona fide pur-
chasers would be entitled to the protection of the innocent owner defense
because the relation back doctrine would cut off their interests.20 5 Second,
because the relation back doctrine is fictive, whether a claimant is entitled
to invoke the innocent owner defense will depend on the statute. The plain
language of § 881(a)(6) simply does not reflect any congressional intent to
limit the defense to bona fide purchasers for value,20 6 nor is any such inten-
tion evident from the floor debate in the Senate.2"7 Additionally, at the
same time it enacted § 881(h), Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), which
204. Justice Kennedy's argument was not a new one, as at least two lower federal courts had
held that the innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(6) protects only bona fide purchasers for
value. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 860 (D.NJ. 1990),
rev'd, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993); United States v. 2901 S.W. 118th
Ct., 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988). O'Brien distinguishes the innocent owner defense of
§ 881(a)(7) from that of § 881(a)(6) on the ground that the forfeitability of property under the
latter depends on how the property was obtained and not how the property was used. O'Brien,
supra note 146, at 538. She also cites the district court opinion in 92 Buena Vista Ave. as support-
ing the proposition that the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(6) applies only to bona fide pur-
chasers. Id. at 538 n.93.
Notably absent from the dissent is any discussion of the relation back doctrine, which was, of
course, the primary issue in the case. See 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1143-46 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). Since the correct formulation of the relation back doctrine is arguably the key to
deciding the case, it is puzzling that the dissent skirted this issue and argued that it would decide
the case on grounds the government had dropped. See id. at 1134 (plurality opinion).
205. For example, consider the Stowell Court's statement that a judicial decree of forfeiture
"avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith." United States v.
Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 17 (1889); see also 1 SMrn, supra note 2, 4.03[4][c][i], at 4-72 & n.66
and accompanying text (making the same argument against lower courts that have applied the
relation back doctrine to cut off the interests of subsequent transferees).
206. See supra note 147.
207. Senator Nunn made these remarks concerning the innocent owner defense of the pro-
posed § 881(a)(6):
We did add a provision in the modification to make it clear that a bona fide party who
has no knowledge or consent to the property he owns having been derived from an
illegal transaction, that party would be able to establish that fact under this amendment
and forfeiture would not occur.
124 CONG. REc. 23,057 (1978). Clearly, the meaning of the term "bona fide party" is crucial to
the interpretation of the statute. Notably, Senator Nunn did not use the term "bona fide pur-
chaser," which by definition is someone who purchases for value. BLACK's LAw DiCrIONARY,
supra note 79, at 177. Standing alone, the term "bona fide" means "[i]n or with good faith;
honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud." Id. Taking the statement as a whole, it
reflects no intention by Congress that the owner have acquired the property for value. Rather, it
manifests an intent that the owner have acquired the property in good faith-that is, without
knowledge of its illegal origins. Cf. 1 SMrrH, supra note 2, 4.03[c], at 4-70 to 4-71 & nn.59-64
(offering a similar analysis).
Advocates of a "bona fide purchaser" interpretation of the innocent owner defense might
point to the following statement in support of their position: "In civil forfeitures ... transfers
[made prior to a decree of forfeiture] are voidable, for the property is considered "tainted" from
the time of its prohibited use or acquisition." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 153, at 196, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3379. However, Congress made this statement six years after it enacted
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not only codified the common-law rule in the criminal forfeiture statute, but
also expressly included a defense to forfeiture limited to bona fide purchas-
ers for value.20° Congress clearly had the opportunity to include the same
limitation in § 881(h) or to so limit the innocent owner defense of
§ 881(a)(6); it chose not to do so. 20 9
Applying the law of voidable title to civil forfeiture law and limiting
the innocent owner defense only to bona fide purchasers for value is an idea
that has some initial attraction and has achieved a measure of support in the
case law and literature. 210 Despite the superficial attraction of applying this
rather clear area of the law to civil forfeitures, a closer look at the underpin-
nings of voidable title law and its application in other areas of the law,
reveals that concerns that are present in those situations simply are not ap-
plicable in the context of civil forfeitures. As a result, applying the law of
voidable title to civil forfeiture law is an inappropriate response to the issue
in 92 Buena Vista Avenue.
First, the law of voidable title, as embodied in section 2-403 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, rests on notions of unjust enrichment at the
expense of a party wrongly deprived of his property.21 In contrast, in civil
forfeiture law, a subsequent donee is not unjustly enriched, except possibly
in the highly fictive sense under the relation back doctrine that the govern-
ment has been wrongly "deprived" of "its" property. In the context of civil
§ 881(a)(6). Of course, what Congress believed a law meant at the time it was enacted is much
more relevant to determining intent than what Congress believed a law meant six years later.
208.
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any
such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may
be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited
to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection
(o) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of the
purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfei-
ture under this section.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 303, § 413(c), 98 Stat. 1837,
2045 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988)).
209. See 1 SMIr, supra note 2, J 4.03[4][c][1], at 4-74 nn.69-71 and accompanying text.
At this point, one might argue that the reason Congress did not alter § 881 to protect expressly
only bona fide purchasers for value was because Congress believed the defense already protected
only those individuals. As previously stated, however, Congress expressed no such intent to limit
the defense in this way when enacting § 881(a)(6) in 1978. See supra notes 149-50 and accompa-
nying text.
210. See, e.g., United States v. 2901 S.W. 118th Ct., 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988);
Jankowski, supra note 20, at 188; O'Brien, supra note 146, at 538-39.
211. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 659 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) ("To allow
Pamela Allen to gain legal and equitable title to the products of [her husband] Roger's embezzle-
ment simply by entering into a property settlement would be to enrich her unjustly at the expense
of [United Mortgage Company].").
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forfeiture law, however, this argument hardly has the force that it does in
the context of fraudulent deprivations of property.
A second problem with Justice Kennedy's analysis involves his con-
cern that drug dealers will be able to hide their assets from forfeiture by
giving them to an innocent third party and recovering them later.212 This
concern simply is not valid. Under the criminal forfeiture provisions of 21
U.S.C. § 853(a), the government normally cannot seize and condemn prop-
erty subject to forfeiture until it has obtained a criminal conviction.21 3 The
time lag between indictment and conviction could give a criminal defendant
a great deal of time with which to shield assets from forfeiture, thus frus-
trating the government's law enforcement goals.2 14 Yet, Congress ad-
dressed this very concern in 1984, when it enacted § 853, the criminal
forfeiture counterpart to § 881, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984. Congress feared criminal defendants might be able to shield
their assets from forfeiture simply by transferring them to a third party.
215
Therefore, in amending the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of
1970, Congress included a provision that protects from criminal forfeiture
only property held by bona fide purchasers for value.21 6
212. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. at 1145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
213. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988). The government can, however, obtain restraining orders
or injunctions against the property owner at the time it files the indictment, or prior to the filing
the indictment under certain limited conditions. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988). It can also seek a
warrant of seizure if it believes restraining orders or injunctions will be insufficient to preserve the
property for forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) (1988).
214. This situation is similar to the one in bankruptcy, in which a bankrupt individual transfers
assets for no value in an effort to shield them from creditors or under circumstances that are unfair
to creditors. Both sorts of transfers are voidable by the bankruptcy trustee as "fraudulent convey-
ances." See generally BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RISNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL
7.06, at 7-57 to 7-79 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing types of fraudulent transfers and the trustee's rights
and remedies in avoiding such transfers).
215. This fear is evidenced by the legislative history:
The problem of pre-conviction disposition of property subject to criminal forfeiture
is further complicated by the question of whether, simply by transferring an asset to a
third party, a defendant may shield it from forfeiture. In civil forfeitures, such transfers
are voidable, for the property is considered "tainted" from the time of its prohibited use
or acquisition.
In sum, present criminal forfeiture statutes do not adequately address the serious
problem of a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets. Changes are necessary both
to preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal forfeiture, and, in those
cases in which he does transfer, deplete, or conceal his property, to assure that he cannot
as a result avoid the economic impact of forfeiture.
S. REp. No. 225, supra note 153, at 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3379; see also id. at
3381 (outlining the amendments to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970).
216. See supra note 208 for the text of § 853(c).
1364 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
Although the concern that criminal defendants might attempt to shield
their assets from forfeiture by fraudulently conveying them to donees prior
to conviction is justified, the same concern does not exist in civil forfeiture
law. Because the government can constitutionally seize the property with-
out notice and a hearing in many civil forefeiture situations, a properly exe-
cuted civil forfeiture makes it virtually impossible for parties to alienate
their assets and thereby shield them from forfeiture. 17 Thus, while every
217. As previously discussed, the government may constitutionally seize personal property
without prior notice or a hearing, and it can seize real property without prior notice and a hearing
in exigent circumstances. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. Accordingly, a wrong-
doer's property may be seized before she has any idea that she is under investigation. Personal
property can be physically seized and held by the government, thus rendering it impossible for the
wrongdoer to deliver the property to a third party. As for seizures of real property, standard
procedure requires the filing of a lis pendens with the register of deeds's office of the county in
which the property is located. If properly recorded, the lis pendens puts all potential purchasers
on notice of the government's claim. See AYLswoRm, supra note 38, at 19. In addition, a copy
of the seizure warrant generally must be affixed in a conspicuous location on the front of the
premises. Id. at 20. Because civil forfeiture proceedings are by definition civil actions, the gov-
ermnent can always seek a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a preliminary injunction pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 65 if it has serious fears that a wrongdoer will try to alienate the property
immediately prior to or after seizure. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114
S. Ct. 492, 503 (1993) (arguing that the government can seek a TRO or preliminary injunction
under FED. R. Civ. P. 65 if it believes that an owner of real property is likely to destroy his
property when notified of a pending forfeiture action).
It might be argued that virtually the same procedures are available under the criminal forfei-
ture statute-in particular, the warrant for seizure the government may seek under 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(f) (1988). See supra note 213. However, under that statute, the government mustfirst
make a showing of probable cause that the property would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction
and that a restraining order or injunction would be insufficient to preserve the property for forfei-
ture upon conviction. Id. In contrast, under 28 U.S.C. Rule C(3) (1988 & Supp. IV), the clerk of
court is required to issue a warrant for seizure "forthwith" upon filing the verified complaint
"without requiring a certification of exigent circumstances." Thus, although the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Good now requires the government to afford notice and a hearing before seizing
real property under the civil forfeiture laws absent exigent circumstances, the government can still
seize real property immediately if it believes time is of the essence; it can delay showing of
exigent circumstances until a later hearing. See 28 U.S.C. Rule C(3) (1988 & Supp. IV).
United States v. Fellows Tracts C, D, E and F of Pine Island Estates, 715 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.
Fla. 1989), illustrates the effects of a sloppily executed forfeiture proceeding. Gregory Flanagan
and Bobby Hardin purchased several tracts of real property at a tax sale in February, 1988. Id. at
361. In July 1988 the government filed an action in rem against the property alleging that a
Bahamian firm had purchased the property with funds traceable to narcotics transactions. Id. The
next month, the government filed notice of lis pendens with the register of deeds's office. Id.
However, the register of deeds recorded the lis pendens only under the letter "U" for "United
States" in the county's grantor/grantee index. Id. Flanagan sued to quiet title to the tracts owned
by him in August 1988; after publication of his claim for the requisite time period, the court
quieted title in him. The Cavanaughs purchased two tracts from Hardin in September 1988. Id. at
362. Flanagan performed the title search himself and issued title insurance to the Cavanaughs
based on that search. Id. Not until January 1989 did the government actually seize the property,
post a copy of the seizure warrant on the property, and direct the Cavanaughs to cease construc-
tion of a house they were building on the property. Id.
Applying the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(6), the court held that, because the
Cavanaughs had no actual notice of the lis pendens, they were good faith purchasers of the prop-
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reason exists to require that subsequent transferees have taken the property
in good faith, no legitimate reason exists to require those transferees to have
acquired the property for value.218
92 Buena Vista Avenue imposes a long overdue restraint on federal
civil forfeiture law, which has raged out of control for years, and has
sparked harsh criticism from the bench,2" 9 legal commentators,2 20 and the
popular media. 2 ' 'This is not a victory for drug dealers," remarked Rich-
ard Troberman, co-chairperson of a task force on forfeiture law for the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, "[i]t is a victory for
erty. Id. While rejecting the government's argument that the lis pendens put the Cavanaughs on
constructive notice of the government's claim and therefore prevented them from being bona fide
purchasers, the court commented that a "prudent title searcher" should have discovered the lis
pendens in a search for any liens held by the government. Id. at 363. However, the court es-
topped the government from denying that the Cavanaughs were "innocent owners," as the Gov-
ernment had delayed for almost five months before seizing the property. Id. The court observed
that, because of the strong public interest in the certainty of land titles, the government had to
"actually or constructively seize the subject property ... within a reasonable time" after com-
mencement of a forfeiture action. Id.
218. One might point out at this juncture that not requiring subsequent transferees to have
taken for value in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings could conceivably create an anoma-
lous situation whereby a subsequent donee might be protected in a civil forfeiture proceeding bout
not in a criminal forfeiture proceeding. While this may be true, it speaks not to a defect in this
argument; rather, it speaks to a defect in the criminal forfeiture statutes. Congress enacted
§ 853(c) to combat the possibility that defendants would transfer their assets to third parties prior
to conviction to shield them from forfeiture. See supra note 215. However, while transfers for no
consideration immediately prior to indictment or afterwards might rightly be deemed presump-
tively fraudulent, such transfers prior to that time might rightly be deemed presumptively non-
fraudulent. In the context of bankruptcy, federal law seems to recognize this distinction by apply-
ing the fraudulent conveyance avoidance provisions only to conveyances made "on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition," 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988), a time
period during which a debtor is likely to feel the grip of his creditors and the inevitable need for
bankruptcy. Since Congress's intent appears to have been to set up a mechanism whereby fraudu-
lent conveyances made to escape criminal forfeitures could be avoided, Congress should amend
the criminal forfeiture statutes to apply the bona fide purchaser requirement only to transferees
who took the property either after indictment or within one month prior to indictment (or some
other suitable but limited time period).
Although Jankowski argues that courts should construe the title of property subject to civil
forfeiture to be voidable rather than void and that courts should adjudicate the claims of innocent
owners by analogizing to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-403, he does not mention the require-
ment in § 2-403 that the transfer be for value; he discusses only the requirement that the transfer
be made in good faith. See Jankowski, supra note 20, at 188.
219. See, e.g., United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("We continue to be enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually
unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in
those statutes.").
220. See, e.g., Bruce B. Conybeare, Jr., Comment, Federal Civil Forfeiture: An Ill-Conceived
Scheme Unfairly Deprives An Innocent Owner of Its Property Interest, 62 U. DE'r. L. REv. 87, 94-
108 (1984).
221. See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
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property owners."2"2  Terrance G. Reed, an adviser to the American Bar
Association's National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, once claimed that the nation's civil forfeiture laws had "become a
Kafkaesque nightmare for some property owners, who have found them-
selves caught up in a world of bizarre legal doctrine, sometimes without
assets even to defend themselves." 2 The very concept of civil forfeiture
offends popular notions of due process and criminal liability, in that its
implementation subjects truly innocent property owners to loss of their
property when they have absolutely no knowledge of any wrongdoing in-
volving their property,224 and even when no crime has been committed.225
By implementing the civil forfeiture mechanism, the government can
bypass the criminal justice system to seize assets suspected of being linked
to the drug trade. Proponents of this mechanism have consequently
trumpeted it as the ideal way to remove the profit from the drug trade and to
provide badly needed funding to law enforcement agencies. Under federal
law,226 funds generated by forfeited assets are transferred into a fund used
to support law enforcement efforts against the drug trade, thus saving scarce
222. David G. Savage, Justices Curb Asset Seizure Tied to Drugs, L.A. TIMS, Feb. 25, 1993,
at Al.
223. Bruce Fein, Taking a Look at Civil Forfeiture, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at Fl. In a
similar vein, David Smith notes:
Criminal defense attorneys confronting their first civil forfeiture case feel like they are
in an Alice-in-Wonderland world where the property owner generally has the burden of
proof, the innocence of the owner is not a defense, rank hearsay is admissible to prove
that the property is 'guilty,' and the government's right to the property vests at the time
it is used illegally rather than at the time of the forfeiture judgment.
I SMrrH, supra note 2, 1.02, at 1-5 to 1-6.
224. Two recent examples receiving media attention illustrate this point. In one instance, a
police lieutenant lost his BMW to sheriff's deputies after they arrested his brother for selling
marijuana. The officer had no idea that his brother was using his car to sell marijuana. Alan
Abrahamson, Reining in Property Seizures by Police, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at A3. In an-
other case, a grandmother of 15, who was a Sunday School teacher and an active community
volunteer, found herself facing a forfeiture action against her house when one of her grandchildren
was charged with selling marijuana from the front porch without her knowledge. World News
Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 16, 1993), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, SCRIPT file [hereinafter World News Tonight]; see also Hyde, supra note 1, at 2-
4 (discussing other instances of innocent persons being deprived of their property by the civil
forfeiture laws).
225. In one typical instance, police officers stopped Selena Williams for speeding and found
in her car approximately $19,000 in cash. She intended to use the money to purchase building
supplies to repair her home, which had been damaged during Hurricane Hugo. Despite the fact
that she showed officers a list of the building supplies she was planning to purchase, the officers
told her they believed the money was drug money and seized it. Their justification was that it was
wrapped in the manner drug dealers wrap their money. She eventually recouped $15,000 of the
money, but the sheriffs department kept the other $4,000. Her attorney advised her that going to
court to get it back would cost more than $4,000 in legal fees. Ms. Williams had never received
so much as a speeding ticket. World News Tonight, supra note 224.
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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public resources.22 7 Over the past decade, this fund has swelled to more
than two billion dollars.228 Furthermore, the federal government shares the
proceeds from asset forfeitures with local law enforcement agencies, creat-
ing a powerful incentive on the part of these agencies to pursue asset for-
feitures aggressively, often at the expense of other law enforcement goals
and innocent persons.229
The government's overzealous use of civil forfeiture law to the detri-
ment of innocent property owners has sparked much criticism. As one
commentator observed,
[C]ivil forfeiture laws [turn] our constitutional system on its
head. To own and use property is a fundamental constitutional
right. A substantial burden should be placed on the government
to both seize and forfeit private property. Because courts have
abdicated their role in protecting private property rights, the gov-
ernment, especially in the context of civil forfeiture, can currently
deprive individuals of property with virtual impunity.230
227. See DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE, supra note 92, at 2 ("With tax dollars becoming scarce, for-
feiture holds the promise of improving drug enforcement while profiting the public treasury!");
John Dillin, Seized Assets Are a Bitter Harvest, CHISTIAN SCI. MONrrOR, Oct. 5, 1993, at 6. The
Department of Justice apparently now depends heavily on forfeited assets as part of its budget.
For example, during fiscal year 1990, when the Department was failing to bring in enough asset
forfeitures to make yearly budget predictions, the Department issued this bulletin to all United
States Attorneys:
We must significantly increase production to reach our budget target .... Failure to
achieve the $470 million projection would expose the Department's forfeiture program
to criticism and undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort must be
made to increase forfeiture income during the remaining three months of [fiscal year]
1990.
U.S. Department of Justice, Forfeiture Income for FY 1990, 38 U.S. Attorneys' Bull. 171, 180
(1990). The Supreme Court quoted this passage in the recent case of United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 n.2 (1993), as an example of the Department of
Justice's "financial stake" in civil forfeiture.
228. Savage, supra note 222, at Al.
229. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 42; Hyde, supra note 1, at 6-7.
Additionally, the asset forfeiture mechanism has had an effect on the focus of law enforce-
ment operations against the drug trade. For instance, Kaplan, Cohn and Springer state that drug
agents in Florida who patrol Interstate 95 (colloquially known as "Cocaine Alley") spend more
time patrolling the southbound lanes, because they are more likely there to catch drug couriers
carrying large amounts of cash to purchase drugs. In contrast, drug traffickers in the northbound
lanes are primarily carrying narcotics which, of course, are not worth as much to law enforcement
as the cash used to purchase them. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 42. Also, police officers in Ventura
County, California killed a man in a raid whom they suspected was involved in the drug trade.
The district attorney determined that the raid was motivated primarily "by a desire to seize and
forfeit the ranch [adjacent to the Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area] for the
government." Hyde, supra note 1, at 3. The police found no drugs in the raid, nor were charges
ever filed. Checking the Fit of Seizures, SAcR mmNtrO BEE, July 1, 1993, at B6.
230. Scott Bullock, Our Civil Forfeiture Laws Are Simply Indefensible, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1993, at C2 (responding to arguments raised by Fein, supra note 223, at Fl, in favor of civil
forfeiture law).
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To cure some of the worst abuses of civil forfeiture law, Representative
Henry Hyde (R.-I1.) has introduced a bill in the House of Representatives
to overhaul civil forfeiture procedure.231 Most notably, the bill would re-
quire the government to prove that property is subject to forfeiture by clear
and convincing evidence instead of a mere showing of probable cause.232
Additionally, the bill would permit the court to appoint counsel for indigent
claimants defending their property against forfeiture; attorneys' fees would
be paid out of the Asset Forfeiture Fund.233
As 92 Buena Vista Avenue demonstrates, the Court also has grown
increasingly dissatisfied with the draconian nature of civil forfeiture.234 92
Buena Vista Avenue is a welcome restraint on the excesses of civil forfei-
ture law. As a result of this decision, subsequent interest holders in prop-
erty potentially subject to forfeiture are entitled to invoke the innocent
owner defense. This decision is consistent with both the history of forfei-
ture law and the congressional intent of §§ 881(a)(6) and 881(h).235 Inno-
cent owners now have more protection against government forfeiture and
seizure of their property than at any time in the history of this country. The
Court's decision correctly restrains a well-intended and powerful legal tool
from abuses that have undermined its legitimacy and allowed it to trample
over the rights of innocent property owners.
J. WILLIAM SNYDER, JR.
231. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
232. Id. § 4.
233. Id. § 5. See generally Jerry Seper, Bill Aims to Reform Asset-Seizure Laws to Protect
Innocent, WASH. TumEs, June 16, 1993, at A5 (outlining the provisions of H.R. 2417); Hyde,
supra note 1, at 7-13 (same).
234. In addition to 92 Buena Vista Ave., the Supreme Court handed down two other decisions
that have virtually rewritten civil forfeiture law. In Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803
(1993), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines applies to
civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). Also, the Court ruled in United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993), that the government must give real
property owners notice and a hearing before seizing their property under the civil forfeiture laws
absent exigent circumstances.
235. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
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